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Reply to Pelletier 
 
 
According to Jérôme Pelletier, the property I appeal to in order to distinguish 
imaginary from real situations, viz. hyper-insulation, is nothing but (or follows from) 
the property of spatio-temporal or causal disconnection. Real situations are spatio-
temporally or causally connected ; but imaginary situations are not spatio-temporally 
or causally connected to real situations. It follows that what happens in the imaginary 
situation described by a certain book has no consequence on what happens in the 
real situation in which the book itself is written or read, and conversely. In particular, if 
there is a man who can fly in the imaginary situation, it does not follow that there is 
such a man in the real situation in which the imaginary situation is described. Now 
this is an example of what I call hyper-insulation : even facts that are ‘persistent’ in 
the logical sense (such as the fact that there is a man who can fly) do not necessarily 
persist when we move upward from imaginary situations to the real situations 
comprising them. 
But the notion of causal disconnection is not itself crystal-clear. What happens 
to the author of the story in the actual world may have an impact upon what he writes 
and therefore upon what happens in the imaginary situations he describes ; and what 
happens in the imaginary situation the author describes may have consequences 
upon the real situation in which he writes. If Superman starts abusing children in the 
imaginary situation, anti-pedophile associations will boycott the Superman stories in 
the actual world. Is there, or is there not, a causal relation between the two facts ? 
One might argue that what causes the boycott of the Superman stories is a real fact : 
the fact that they feature Superman as a pedophile. But this real fact is a fact about 
an imaginary situation : it is the fact that, in the imaginary situation described by the 
stories in question, Superman behave as a pedophile. The idea that imaginary 
situations are causally disconnected from the actual world is not crystal-clear 
because certain real situations (e.g. books and other fictions) ‘comprise’ imaginary 
situations. When the causal consequences of a real situation (say, the publication of 
the new Superman stories) are essentially tied to the properties that situation has in 
virtue of comprising an imaginary situation (say, a situation in which Superman 
behaves badly), there is a sense in which the imaginary situation itself has those 
consequences and causally affects the actual world, via the path that does exist 
between the real situation and the imaginary situation. That path is the comprise 
relation, which here takes the form of one situation containing a description of the 
other. To be sure, the path in question is not a spatio-temporal or causal path internal 
to the actual world, but an ‘intentional’ path which essentially involves a shift from the 
actual world to some other possible world. But this intuitive distinction is precisely 
what we are trying to make sense of : we are trying to make sense of the idea that 
some situations — those to which we have access through books and other 
representations — are merely ‘imaginary’. My suggestion is that hyper-insulation is 
criterial : whenever the comprise relation between two situations s1 and s2 involves a 
world-shift, in such a way that s2 is ‘imaginary’ with respect to the parent situation s1, 
then even if a fact  belongs to the persistent variety, its being a fact in s2 does not 
entail that it is a fact also in s1 (contrary to what happens when s1 and s2 belong to 
the same world). 
 
* 
 
Pelletier wonders whether the fact that imaginary worlds are insulated from the actual 
world and from each other prevents them from containing the same individuals. As is 
well-known, Kripke accepts trans-world individuals, while Lewis takes individuals to 
be ‘world-bound’. For Kripke, however, only actual individuals can be stipulated to 
exist in other possible worlds, because nonactual individuals (e.g. fictional 
individuals) lack clear conditions of individuation: 
 
Granted that there is no Sherlock Holmes, one cannot say of any possible 
person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed. Several 
distinct possible people, and even actual ones such as Darwin or Jack the 
Ripper, might have performed the exploits of Holmes, but there is none of 
whom we can say that he would have been Holmes had he performed these 
exploits. For if so, which one ? (Kripke 1980 : 158) 
 
In Lewis’ system, identity across possible worlds is ruled out on principle. No 
individual, whether actual or fictional, can exist in more than one possible world.  But 
the inhabitants of one possible world may have ‘counterparts’ in other possible 
worlds. Fictional individuals are just like other individuals, in this respect. If an actual 
individual is found who is called ‘Sherlock Holmes’, performs the exploits of Holmes, 
has a friend named ‘Watson’ with such and such characteristics, etc.,  in the actual 
world, there will be no doubt that that person is a ‘counterpart’ of Sherlock Holmes in 
the actual world. 
Pelletier takes both Kripke and Lewis to be insulationists who reject the 
possibility for fictional individuals to show up in the actual world ; and he thinks 
metaleptic narratives in which the author of a fiction meets one of his or her fictional 
characters cannot be handled consistently within Lewis’s theory of fictional truth if 
one accepts insulationism. For Lewis, a sentence ‘In fiction f, ’ is true iff  is true at 
every possible world where f is told as known fact rather than fiction (Lewis 1983 : 
268). Pelletier objects that if one is an insultationist (as he takes Lewis to be), then 
there is no possible world in which a metaleptic narrative is told as known fact. I think 
that objection fails because Lewis is not really an insulationist : he can accept the 
possibility for the (actual or fictional) author of a fiction to meet a counterpart, in his 
world, of the fictional character he has created. The only argument for considering 
Lewis an insulationist is his wholesale rejection of trans-world identity in favour of a 
less demanding counterpart relation, but this is irrelevant to the issue about 
metalepsis.  
Be that as it may, I need not take a stand on those issues because, contrary to 
what Pelletier suggests, my claim that imaginary situations are ‘hyper-insulated’ from 
the real situations containing them entails nothing regarding insulationism, as 
described by Pelletier. Hyper-insulation means that if Superman kisses Lois Lane in 
the imaginary situation, it does not follow that he kisses her in the actual situation in 
which the imaginary situation is described. This entails nothing regarding the 
possibility or impossibility for Superman and Lois Lane or for their counterparts to 
exist in the actual situation in question. 
 
* 
 
The last issue Pelletier raises regards simulation. I hold that meta-representations 
are essentially simulative, for they contain the representation they are about as a 
proper part ; hence one cannot, for example, entertain the thought that my cousin 
believes that Paris is a large city without eo ipso entertaining the thought that Paris is 
a large city. This implies that we cannot meta-represent the thoughts of creatures 
whose concepts we do not possess. Pelletier objects that when we meta-represent, 
the thought expressed by the embedded portion is not necessarily identical to the 
thought actually entertained by the ascribee. Perhaps my cousin does not literally 
entertain the thought ‘Paris is a large city’, but has a similar thought, which I report by 
saying (or thinking) that he believes Paris to be a large city. This is true, but so what? 
The meta-representer cannot but entertain the thought that he is ascribing ; whether 
this thought exactly or approximately corresponds to the ascribee’s actual thought is 
another matter. Goldman writes that « the output state [of the simulation procedure 
used in predicting an agent’s emotion or affect in a given circumstance] should be 
viewed as pretend or surrogate state, since presumably a simulator doesn’t feel the 
very same affect or emotion as a real agent would » (Goldman 1995 : 189). In the 
same way, the thought which the meta-representer ascribes and which (I claim) he is 
bound to entertain should perhaps be viewed as a pretend or surrogate thought, 
since it need not correspond exactly to the ascribee’s thought. This is not a problem 
for me, and there is no reason to assume that my brand of simulationism is closer to 
Gordon’s radical simulationism than it is to Goldman’s, or that it corresponds to the 
imaginative project which Wollheim calls ‘empathizing’. 
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